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IN THE SUPREME COLIRT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
C. EUGENE LARSON, SR.,
Plaintiff,
-vsASSOCIATES FINANCIAL SERVICE
COMPANY, INC., a corporation,
and NORTH\.JEST ACCEPTAtlCE
CORPORATION, a corporation,
HUGH GARDNER, DONALD H. WAGSTAFF,
JR., UNIVERSAL DIAMOND REO SALES
AND SERVICE, and UNIVERSAL DISTRIBUTl NG COMPANY, INC.,

Case No. 14815

Defendants.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an appeal by C. Eugene Larson, Sr., of the Judgment entered on July 19, 1976, by the Honorable Earnest F. Baldwin,
Judge of the Third Judicial Court in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah.
DISPOSITION HI THE

LO~IER

COURT

The Court below ruled in favor of the Defendants, holding
that the Execution Sale conducted in this matter, subsequent to
Judgment and pursuant to a District Court Hrit of Execution, was
invalid because it v1as directed to the sheriff of the county where
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the property is situated; but was carried out by a deputy
constable.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Appellant contends that the Court below
erred and that the Judgment should be set aside; and a Judgment entered herein in favor of the Plaintiff-Appellant

grant-

ing him the relief prayed for in his original Compl<lint.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Plaintiff in the above-entitled case, C. Eugene
Larsen, Sr., brought suit against Universal Diamond Reo Sales
and Service, in the District Court of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Civil No.
205417, and obtained a Judgment against this Defendant in
that case, for the sum of $9,166.62, together with interest
at the rate of eight percent (8%) per annum, on or about the
4th day of January, 1974.

No payment was ever made to Plaintiff-

Appellant by Universal Diamond Reo Sales and Service, pursuant to the Judgment.
The llefendant, Universal Diamond Reo SalPs and
Service, was in the business of selling vehicles to various
customers under contracts, whereby the customers 1-1ere to
make installment payments on said vehicles over a period of
time, in satisfaction of their contracts.

Various of such

contracts were sold or assigned by Universal Diamond Reo
Sales and Service to the Defendants in the present action,
Associates Financial Services Company,lnc., and North1-1est
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Acceptance Corporation.

Both Northwest Acceptance Corporation

and Associates Financial Service Company, Inc., hold a substantial
number of such contracts, some of which are paid in full and some
of which hold reserves.

Plaintiff-Appellant contends that these

amounts which were owed to Universal Diamond Reo Sales and Service
are now due to Plaintiff-Appellant by virtue of the Judgment described above.
iff.

The exact amount thereof is not known to the Plaint-

The payment of these reserve accounts is the subject of the

controversy herein.
Subsequent to the obtaining of Judgment in case No.
205417, an Execution was issued out
trict Court, on February 5, 1974.

of the Third Judicial DisThis Execution provided-that

levy and sale was to be made of all right, title, and interest of
Universal Diamond Reo Sales and Service in and to reserves, contract, cash holdbacks, lease reserves, and participation interest
of Universal Diamond Reo Sales and Service, held by Northwest
Acceptance Corporation and Associates Financial Service Company,
Inc., accumulating to the benefit of Universal Diamond Reo Sales
and Service.
This Execution was directed to the Sheriff of Salt Lake
County and did not contain a return date.
Plaintiff also prepared a Praecipe directed to the Sheriff
of Salt Lake County, directing him to levy and sell the above
described assets.
Such sale was duly conducted by William L. Mciff, a

-3-
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Deputy Constable of the Eleventh Precinct of Salt Lake County,
Utah, on the tenth day of April, 1974.

At said sale, Plaintiff

and Appellant, C. Eugene Larsen, Sr., purchased al I right,
title, and interest of Universal Diamond Reo Sales and
Service in and to the above described reserves, contracts,
cash holdbacks, lease reserves and participation

of Uni-

versal. Diamond R.eo Sales and Service, held by Northwest
Acceptance Corporation and Associates Financial Services
Company, Inc.

The return on the sale was duly filed with

the Court, and showed that two months had passed betv1een the
time the execution was presented to the Constable and the
time of the Sale.
Subsequent to said Execution Sale, Universal Diamond Reo Sales and Service, the Defendant in the first action,
Civil No. 205417, made an assignment of its interest in
and to the above described reserves, contracts, cash holdbacks, lease reserves and participation, to Hugh Gardner and
Donald H.

Wagstaff, Jr., Defendants herein.

Mr. Gardner

and Mr. Wagstaff were officers of Universal Diamond Reo
Sales and Service at the time said assignment was made.

The

Records of the Secretary of State, for the State of Utah,
and the District Court transcript, shov1 that, as a matter of
fact, the Defendant, Universal IJiamonrl f\eo Sales and Service, 1,1as a corporation v1hich had been suspended at the time
this transfer was made.

Further, Plaintiff-Appellant con-
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tends that this attempted assignment is void because it was an
attempt to transfer assets in fraud of creditors.
Nothing

was recovered by Plaintiff-Appellant subse-

quent to the above described sale.

So on or about the 15th day

of July, 1974, Plaintiff and Appellant, by and through his counsel, filed a complaint in the Third District Court, in and for
Salt Lake County, Civil #220975.

In said Complaint, Plaintiff

and Appellant sought the following:

(1) an order form the Court

ordering all of the above named Defendants to appear to Show
Cause why they should not be prohibited from transfering or otherwise disposing of all the terests, described above, which were_
due to Universal Diamond Reo;

(2) an accounting from all the

Defendants on all Universal Diamond Reo Sales and Service contracts; (3) for a Judgment in Plaintiff's favor of $9,166.62,
plus interest at eight percent (8>o:) from January 4, 1974, until
paid; and (4) for a Judgment ordering the Defendants to pay
Plaintiff all sums which in future accrue in favor of Universal
Diamond Reo Sales and Service, as a result of any contracts,
agreements or understandings between the Defendants herein and
Universal Diamond Reo Sales and Services.
f, trial v1as secheduled in this case, Civi I #220975, on

the 19th day of July, 1976.

Prior to the time of trial, Defend-

ant, tforthv1est Acceptance Corporation and Defendant, Associates
Financial Services,
Plaintiff.

Inc., both entered into a Stipulation 1vith

These Stipulations became part ofthe Court record at

-s-
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the time of trial.

They were simi 1 iar and provided, in

pertinent part, that; these Defendants made no claim of
right to the contract reserves, the subject of the litigation, beyond their rights to satisfy all claims due them
upon the contracts of Universal Diamond Reo Sales and Service, held by them; and these two Defendants agreed to be
bound by the holding of the Court 1-1ith respect to viho a.med
the reserves.
The matter came on for trial before the Honorable
Ernest F. Baldwin, sitting without a jury on the 19th day of
July, 1976.

The Defendant, Northwest Acceptance Corporation

appeared at the time of trial, through its counsel, Scott H.
Clark; and Associates Financial Service Company did not
appear.

Then Plaintiff, by and through his counsel of rec-

ord, Glen M. Hatch and Les! ie A. Lewis, and Defendants, Hugh
Gardner and Universal Diamond Reo Sales and Service and
Universal Distributing Company, by and through their counsel, Paul N. Cotro-Manes, presented testimony and put on
evidence relative to the above described facts and claims;
and at the Court's request, Mr. Contro-Manes and Mr. Hatch
and t\s. Le1·ris submitted legal memorandums on behalf of their
clients.
The Court concluded and held that;
1.

That pursuant to Rule 69 (b), Utah Rules of

Ci vi 1 Procedure, a Writ of Execution out of the District
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Court must be issued to the Sheriff of the County where the property or some part thereof is situated and that, as a matter of
law, a \lrit of Execution directed to a Sheriff must be carried
out by that Sheriff pursuant to the direction of such Writ.
2.

That pursuant to Rule 4(m), Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, as amended by the Supreme Court of Utah in 1972, it is
specifically stated that a Constable may "serve" process issued
out of the District Court, however, this Rule does not amend by
implication Rule 69.
3.

The Court further held that the sale conducted by

the Deputy Constable, William L. Mciff, on the 10th day of April,
1974, v1as null and void in that said sale exceeded the jurisdiction of a Constable, under the Statutes of the State of Utah, or
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and that, therefore, as a
matter of law, the Plaintiff, C. Eugene Larsen, Sr., obtained
nothing by reason of said sale.
4.

That Court further finds that pursuant to 16-20-101,

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended by the Session Laws of 1961,
that after dissolution of a corporation, the corporate existence
continues on for the purpose of winding up its affairs and that to
effect such purpose, such corporation may sell or otherwise dispose of such property and assets, sue and be sued, contract and
exercise all other incidental and necessary powers.
5.
Defendan~

The Court concluded as a matter of law that the

Universal Diamond Reo Sales and Service had authority to
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execute the assignment of its reserves being held by the
Defendant Northwest Acceptance Corporation to the Defendants
Gardner and Wagstaff.
Plaintiff objected to these Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and moved to have the same amended.

The

Court reviewed the Objections by Plaintiff and denied the
Motion.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE EXECUTION SALE CONDUCTED IN CASE NO. 205417,
WAS PROPERLY CONDUCTED AND SHOULD BE ACCORDED
FULL LEGAL EFFECT SINCE UTAH LAW GIVES A DEPUTY
CONSTABLE AUTHORITY TO SERVE PROCESS.
Defendants have asserted that the Execution sale
which took place herein on the 10th day of April, 1974, was
improperly conducted and therefore has no legal affect.
They contend that the sale is invalid because it was conducted by a Deputy Constable.
Utah Statutes provide that certain county officers,
including county commissioners, the county treasurer, the
sheriff, etc., are to be appointed.

Utah Code Annotated

17-16-2, further provides that "Such others as may be provided by law", may be appointed to help perform the duties
required of those appointed.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 17-26-7, deals with
the appointment of deputies.

This Section, provides, in
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pertinent part, "Deputies-Appointment Liability of_Principal.-

Every

county, precinct or district officer, except a county commissioner
or a judicial officer, may, by and with the consent of the Board
of County Commissioners, appoint as many deputies and assistants
as may be necessary for the prompt and faithful discharge of the
duties of his office; provided, that the Board shall allow the
Clerk of the District Court such deputies and assistants to transact the business pertaining to the District Courts as may be
deemed necessary and advisable by the Judge or Judges of the
District Court.

The appointment of a deputy must be made in

writing and filed in the office of the County Clerk.

Until such

appointment is so made and filed and until such deputy shall have
taken the oath of office, no one shall be or act as such deputy.
Any officer appointing any deputy shall be liable for all official acts of such deputy."

This Section makes it clear that the

need for deputies to help conduct the county's business, was
clearly contemplated.

Appointment of such deputies was deemed

both permissible and necessary.
There is even more direct Statutory authority for the
position taken by Plaintiff-Appellant.

Section 17-16-8 of the

Utah Code Annotated, provides as fol lows;

"Powers, Duties and

Liabilities of Deputies.- Whenever the official name of any principal officer is used in any Jaw conferring powers or imposing
duties or liabilities it includes deputies."

It is clear from
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this section and the preceeding sections, which

~e

have

quoted herein, that a deputy constable has the power, and
can perform the same acts 1-:hich a constable is authorized to
perform.

In this instance, a Deputy Constable, \Jilliam L.

Mciff, performed the functions that 1·.ould ordinarily
have been performed by a constable or a sheriff.

That is to

say, that he served the Execution on those involved and
posted notice of the same, made adequate returns, etc.
PO I NT Th'C
THE EXECUTION SALE CONDUCTED HEREIN, IN CASE
NO. 205417, \./AS PROPERLY CONDUCTED PJW SHOULD
BE ACCORDED FULL LEGAL EFFECT, SI tlCE U~IDER
UTAH LAW A COtlSTABLE t'.AY LEVY A \:RIT DIRECTED
TO A SHER I FF.
Defendants have contended that the fact that the
Writ of Execution in the above described case 1·1as directed
to the Sheriff, precludes the possibility of a Constable
making levy on the same.

It is our contention that, based

upon Statutory law, corrrnon practice, and the intent of the
Supreme Court in drafting the rules of Civil Procedure for
the State of Utah this is clearly not the case.
Rule 69(b) makes reference to the Sheriff c~ly,

it

provides as follows; "(b) Contents of ~lrit and to l·:ho"1 It
May Be Directed.- The \lrit of Execution rcust te issued

in

the name of the State of Utah, sealed with the seal of the
Court and subscribed by the clerk.

It r,ay C,e

iss·~ed

to the

Sheri ff of any county in the state (and ray be issued at the
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same tine to different counties) but 1·1here it requires the delivery
or possession or sale of real or personal property,

it ra.Jst be issued

to the Sheri ff of the county where the property or sor:ie part therof
is situated.

It nust intel 1 igently refer to the Judgment stating the

Court, the county 1-1here the same is entered or docketed, the names
of the parties, the Judgment, and,

if it is for money, the <r.iount

thereof, and the amount actually due thereon.

It shall be directed

to the Sheriff of the county in 1·;hich it is to be executed and shall
require the officer to proceed in accordance with the terms of the
Writ; and provided that if such Urit is against the property of the
Judgnent debtor generally it shall direct the officer to satisfy
the Judgment, with interest, out of the personal property of the
debtor, and if sufficient personal property cannot be found, then
out of his real property."
These Sections of Rule G9, of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, state unequivocally that

2

Writ must be directed

to the Sheri ff of the County \'/here the property to be sold is
sit~oited.

In accordance 1·1ith this Rule, counsel for Plaintiff

directed the Writ of Execution in this matter to the Sheriff of
Salt Lake County.
Hrn.;ever, Rule 69 cannot be read alone.

Rule 4(m), of

the Utah Rules of Ci vi 1 Procedure, nust be read in conjunction
1-1ith f;ulef9(b).
Constabie.

Rule 4(rc) provides as follm.;s:

"Service by

All \irits and process, including executions upon

Judgments, issued out of a District, City or Justice Court in a
civil <iction or proceeding nay be served by any consta~le of the
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county."

This Rule, when read in conjunction with Rule

69(b), seems to give two conflicting directions.

On the one

hand, Rule 69 makes it imperative that the Writ of Execution
be directed to the Sheriff, on the other hand, Rule 4(m),
establishes that service of Writs, including executions upon
Judgments, may be served by any Constable of the county.

The

committee note concerning Rule 4(m), states that Rule 4(m)
was amended by the Supreme Court on June 23, 1971, and was
effective January 1, 1972.
before the word "City."

The amendment inserted "District"

This Rule, adopted by the Supreme

Court, leaves 1 ittle doubt in anyone's mind about the power
of constables to serve process.
In Defendants' Points and Authorities, on file herein, counsel refers to the case of Rich v. Industrial Commission,
et al, 80 U. 511, 15 P. 2d 641, (Utah, 1932).

This case is

cited for the proposition that, "the constable has no authority,
in the absence of a statute, to serve process in a civil action."
Plaintiff-Appellant does not take issue with this case.
is no question about this legal statement.

There

However, Appellant

does take issue with the conclusion that Defendants draw from
this case.
Defendants assert that, based upon this case, the constable had no authority to conduct the execution sale or to serve
process in case No. 205417.

This is inaccur-ilte.

A

Rule of

Lai~

was adopted subsequent to this case, providing that a constable does
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have this authority as stated hereinabove.

Rule 4(m), of the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure, was adopted in its original form, in 1951,
and amended, to include the

~1ord

"District'; in 1971.

This Rule pro-

vides, in its amended form, as discussed above, that all writs, including executions, issued out of the District Court, may be served.
by a Constable.

It follows that it was the clear intent of the

Supreme Court to give Constables the authority to serve process as
well as conduct execution sales in connection with the same.

Therefore,

Defendants' assertion that Rich v. Industrial Commission, (supra),
supports their position is inaccurate.
The reason for the adoption of the Rule seems obvious.
The dearth of sheriffs and the substantial and ever increasing
amount of process, which must be served in the state of Utah,
makes it necessary for Constables to assist Sheriffs in the service of process and in the conducting of execution sales.

The

Supreme Court recognizing this pragmatic necessity carefully considered this Rule and adopted the same.
Further, it is the general practice by attorneys in
this state to follow the procedure used by Plaintiff-Appellant's
counsel in this instance.

That is to say, that the use of a Con-

stable in this instance was not unusual, but rather, it was in keeping with the normal practice of most attorneys in this state.
To require an attorney to use only Sheriffs to serve process and levy on executions as described herein, is requiring the
impossible in view of the existing numbers of Sheriffs and the num-
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bers of papers requiring service.

A change in the procedure

of this import would have great impact and far reaching disastrous effects upon the Judicial system in this state.
Rule 69(b) literally leaves no room for the Clerk
of the Third Judicial Court to issue a Writ to anyone other than
a sheriff.

Therefore, the Writ prepared in this matter, was

directed to the sheriff.

However, Rule 4(m), amended in

1972, makes it clear that the Supreme Court was trying to
create a workable system by enlarging the group who could
serve process and Writs.

It appears that in attempting to

create a workable system, the Supreme Court implied that
whenever "Sheriff" is used in the Rules in connection with
the service of Writs and process, including Executions upon
Judgments, the word "Sheriff" should be read to mean that
catagory of Sheriffs, Deputy Sheriffs, Constables, and Deputy
Constables.
Thus, the Writ directed in this case to the "Sheriff"
as required by Rule 69(b), must be interpreted to include a
constable and deputy constable, as wel 1.
Therefore, the Execution Sale in case No. 205417, was
properly conducted and complied with both the spirit and the exact wording of the la1;.
POINT THREE
THE FAILURE OF THE CONSTABLE TO FILE A RETURN ON
THE EXECUTION SALE DOES NOT INVALIDATE THIS SALE.
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Defendants have contended that the Constable's failure
to file a return on the Execution Sale conducted was fatal.

This

point was not raised by the pleadings, but was considered by the
Court and included in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, so this point is addressed at this time.

In the Certificate

of Sale, which was filed shortly after Apri 1 10, 1974, the Deputy
Constable, stated that the sale was conducted after due and legal
notice was given.

In the supplemental return on the execution

sale, of August, 1976, the Constable states where and when the
postings

~1ere

made.

It should be noted that this return set

forth the pertinent details in connection with the sale, with
great specificity.

We contend that this is sufficient to comply

with Rule 69, Subparagraphs (d) and (e).
Further, if Defendants, Universal Diamond Reo Sales and
Service, Universal Distributing Company, or Hugh Gardner, desired,
they could have interrogated the Constable as to further details
regarding this sale, at the time of trial.

There is little ques-

tion about whether or not the Defendants in this law suit received actual notice.

The fact that actual notice was received

is clear from a review of the return discussed above and other
information in the transcript furnished to this Court.
There remains an additional anci lliary question, as to
the time] iness of the filing of the full return on the Execution Sale.
Althou<Jh the Writ, did not inclucle a return date 1 the
provisions of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 69(c), require
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that it be made returnable not later than two months after
its receipt by the Constable.

The failure to make the entry

could not extend the time to begin the service of the execution.
Rule 69(d) reads as follows:
''Service of the Writ.

Unless the execution other-

wise directs, the officer must execute the Writ against the
property of the Judgment debtor by levying on a sufficient
amount of property, if there is sufficient; collecting or
selling the choses in action and selling the other property,
and paying to the Judgment creditor or his attorney so much
of the proceeds as will satisfy the Judgment.
When an officer has begun to serve an execution
issued out of any Court on or before the return date of
such execution, he may complete the service and return
thereof after such return date.

If he sha 11 have begun to

serve an execution, and shal 1 die or be incapable of completing. the service and return thereof, the same may be
completed by any other officer who n1ight by law, execute the
same if delivered to him; and if the first officer shall not
have made a certificate of his doings, the second officer
shall certify whatever he shal 1 find to have been done by
the first, and shall add thereto a certificate of his cwn
doings in completing the service."
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Since the Writ was issued on February 5, 1974, and was
levied on February 8, 1974, the officer had "begun to serve an
execution • • • on or before the return day."

Therefore, he was

entitled to "complete the service and return thereof after such
return date."

No other limitation regarding the timeliness of

the filing of the full return seems to exist.
that the technicalities

Thus, we submit

required to vest title to the choses in

action, have been complied with in this execution.
POI NT FOUR
THE PURPORTED ASSIGNMENT IS INVALID SINCE IT WAS
/\ADE BY A SUSPENDED CORPORATION AND WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY CONSIDERATION.
This lawsuit also deals viith an issue concerning
the validity of the alleged assignment, dated February 21, 1974,
made by Universal Diamond Reo Sales and Service to Defendants,
Hugh Gardner and Donald \.Jagstaff.

The facts are uncontroverted

that at the time this assignment v1as made, Universal Diamond Reo
Sales and Service had been suspended.

The District Court's Find-

ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law make this point clear.

It

appears from the Court record that this suspension was based on
Universal Diamond Reo Sales and Services'
taxes due and owing.

inability to pay state

This alleged assignment occurred subsequent

to the levy, of February 8, 1974, as discussed herein.
The issue of the validity of the .:issignment vias never
clearly dealt vii th at the time of trial, for the reason that this
question is moot if the Court finds that the Execution Sale
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is valid.

The assignment appears to have been an effort by a

corporation, unable to pay its debts, to transfer its only
remaining assets to the officers of the corporation.

This

Court must scrutinize such actions with great care, and sanction the same only where fully justified.
It is generally held that the dissolution of a corporation or the suspension of a corporation's charter, implies
the termination of its existence and its complete extinction as
an entity.

This general rule is set forth in 19 AM JUR 2d 1646

et seq.
Section 1653 of this volume provides that; "The extinction of contractual power which is produced by the dissolution of a corporation necessarily involves an incapacity
to proceed with the execution of contracts partially performed
or wholly executory as to the corporation at the time of its
dissolution," (at Page 1002 of 19 AM JUR 2d).

If this rule

is applied to the case at hand, the assignment must be found
invalid.
In addition to the question of v1hether this corporation
could enter into an assignment agreement, when suspended, there
is the additional question of whether this assignment agreement
was supported by actual consideration.

An examination of the

purported assignment reveals that the stated consideration
for the assignment is;

"For and in consideration of the

guarantee of all of the contracts and sales agreements of
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assignor, said guarantee having heretofore been delivered to Northwest Acceptance Corporation .

II

Plaintiff-Appellant prepared a Subpoena Duces Tecum,
issued by the Third Judicial District Court, and directed to Northwest Acceptance Corporation, requiring Northwest to furnish the
following documents:

"Any and all personal individual guarantees

which Northwest holds, signed by either Hugh Gardner or Donald
H. Wagstaff, which in any way or at any time guaranteed performance by Universal Diamond Reo Sales and Service, Utah corporation, of its ob] igation pursuant to its agreement of August 27,
1971, vii th Northwest Acceptance Corpora ti on and the contract sold
by it to lforth11est Acceptance Corporation." In response to this
Subpoena Duces Tecum, Defendant Northwest Acceptance Corporation,
furnished certified copies of all such guarantees.
same are part of the record herein.

Copies of the

The guarantees are dated

August 21, 1971, December 16, 1971, and v1ere obviously executed in
conjunction with the orginal master agreement between Universal
Diamond Reo Sales and Service and Northwest Acceptance Corporation,
dated July 16, 1976.
The Restatement of Contracts, Section 76(a), provides
that there is no consideration for a contract if one of the promisors
promises to do an act which he is already bound to do for the promissee.

There is no exchange of value in such a situation.

The pro-

misor, as in this case, vJOuld be getting nothing mre than that to
v1hich he 1·1as already entitled; and the promisee parts v1ith nothing
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beyond that which he 1·1as already bound to give.

Therefore,

in the language of the Restatement, a benefit to the promisor and a detriment to the promisee is totally lacking, and
no consideration exists.

Thus, the purported assignment of

February 21, 1974, must fail for want of consideration.
Wilson v. Davis, 76 P. 2d 69, (Cal. App.

1938), is

one of the classic cases on this subject of promising to do
what one is already bound to do.

In that case, the Court

found that there was no consideration since the Promisor
agreed to perform that which he was already legally and morally
obligated to do.
Further, it appears clear that the recital of consideration in this assignment is a ruse designed to cover an
illegal act:

i.e., defrauding creditors, specifically the

Plaintiff herein.
POI NT FIVE
ALL OF THE PROCEEDINGS INVOLVED HEREIN ARE IN
AID OF EXECUTIOM 1\t!D OUGHT TO BE ACCORDED FULL
LEGAL EFFECT, PURSUANT TO RULE 69, OF THE UTAH
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
The District Court has a duty to use its powers to
aid the collection of the rlebt involved herein.
The District

Court has ample pov1er under the

Statutes and Rules of Civil Procedure, discussed herein, to
take cognizance of the circumstances of the case and, without regard to the validity of the Execution Sale, to simply
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I

order the Defendant, Associates Financial Service Company, and
the Defendant, Northwest Acceptance Corporation, to pay the sums
they held, over to the Plaintiff, pursuant to the Judgment in
case rio. 205417.
The District Court certainly has power to ignore an
assignment of a corporation's sole asset, made by and to the
officers of an insolvent corporation.

Further, there is not

even an assignment involved in connection with the Associates
Financial Services' account, so at the very least the Court
should order the sums due by them paid to the Plaintiff.

If, as

a result of the District Court's ruling, the Defendants, Universal Diamond Reo Sales and Service, have already received that
money from Associates Financial Service Company, the Court could
order the sums owed paid to Plaintiff out of the Northwest Acceptance Corporation obi igation.
The Rules on executions are liberal rules designed to
effect justice.

These rules should be interpreted in such a

way as to make that end a real possibility.

The District Court

herein interpreted the rules on execution in such a way as to
avoid its duty in this regard.
It is clear that Plaintiff-Appellant is entitled to the
award granted by the Court in case No. 2054J7.

A Liberal inter-

pretation of the rules would allow him to recover the amounts due
him under the Judgment in case No. 205417.
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CONCLUSION
It is Plaintiff-Appellant's contention that based upon
the law discussed herein and based upon common practice
by attorneys in the State of Utah, the Execution Ssle was properly conducted and valid.

This sale vested in Plaintiff all

rights in and to the contract reserves, etc., that Defendants
hold as described herein.
It is also Plaintiff's contention that the assignment
described herein, made subsequent to the execution sale, has no
legal effect since it was made by a suspended corporation, and
was lacking in consideration, and was made in fraud of creditors.
Finally, it is Plaintiff's contention that the District Court could have and should have looked at the Rules in
the light most favorable to aiding the execution and found that
said sale was legally effective.
Even if the sale were invalid, the Court had personal
jurisdiction over all of the parties, and has ample authority to
order the Defendants, who hold the reserves, to pay them to the
Plaintiff when due.

~~7·/

HAT~~

GLEtl 11.
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